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Abstract
Small, carefully crafted perturbations called adversar-
ial perturbations can easily fool neural networks. However,
these perturbations are largely additive and not naturally
found. We turn our attention to the field of Autonomous
navigation wherein adverse weather conditions such as fog
have a drastic effect on the predictions of these systems.
These weather conditions are capable of acting like nat-
ural adversaries that can help in testing models. To this
end, we introduce a general notion of adversarial pertur-
bations, which can be created using generative models and
provide a methodology inspired by Cycle-Consistent Gener-
ative Adversarial Networks to generate adversarial weather
conditions for a given image. Our formulation and results
show that these images provide a suitable testbed for steer-
ing models used in Autonomous navigation models. Our
work also presents a more natural and general definition of
Adversarial perturbations based on Perceptual Similarity. 1
1. Introduction
Autonomous navigation has occupied a central position
in the efforts of computer vision researchers in recent years.
Autonomous vehicles can not only aid navigation in urban
areas but also provide critical support in disaster-affected
areas, places with unknown topography (such as Mars), and
many more. The vast potential of the applications thereof
and the feasibility of the solutions in contemporary times
has led to the growth of several organizations across indus-
try, academia, and government institutions that are investing
significant efforts on self-driving vehicles. Computer vision
has been studied and shown to play an important role in the
development of autonomous navigation technologies over
the years [17][14][19]. Vision tasks such as image-level
classification, object detection, semantic segmentation, as
well as steering angle prediction, play critical roles in the
development of autonomous vehicles. The increasing em-
phasis of this problem domain has also led to the creation
1Accepted to WACV 2020
of different vision datasets that are necessary to develop so-
lutions across different geographies [10][23][37].
Figure 1: Steering Angle(radians) deviation seen in the
same scene due to Fog, for the AutoPilot model[8]. Lower
image was generated by our method given the left image
It is common knowledge now that deep neural networks
have achieved state-of-the-art performance in many com-
puter vision tasks [16, 25]. With great leaps in performance,
deep learning models have been deployed in many physi-
cal systems, and efforts have been afoot to develop robust
deep neural network models for autonomous vehicles too
[5][8][33]. However, the recent mishaps involving self-
driving vehicles has necessitated the requirement for test-
ing such deep learning models with data in various condi-
tions. Existing efforts largely rely on copious amounts of
collected data from the real world, data augmentation using
simple affine transformations [35] or the use of data from
synthetic/virtual environments [30] for various conditions.
There is an impending need for methods that can provide
data with a wider variety of conditions that can validate the
robustness of the learned models for vision tasks in such
settings, in order to save lives and property in the future.
One such important dimension is the variability of a given
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environment under various weather conditions. Real-world
studies such as [1] have shown that bad weather can alone
manage to crash navigation systems. It is hence important
to train deep learning models with as many weather con-
ditions of a given environment as possible to obtain robust
systems in deployment. Our efforts in this work are towards
addressing this need.
From a different perspective, many recent efforts have
also been made to study the robustness of deep neural net-
work models, by showing how vulnerable they can be to-
wards adversarial perturbations [2], which involve adding a
small amount of noise to the input data in order to fool the
model. Attempts have been made to show that systems per-
forming essential day-to-day tasks such as face and speech
recognition [34][7], as well as physical systems [20] can
be attacked using such adversarial perturbations. Similar
efforts have also been attempt to attack autonomous navi-
gation models such as in [13][9]. These efforts use adver-
sarial patches [6] physically placed in the field of view of
the model to fool it. However, as shown in a very recent
work [18], natural adversarial examples are sufficient to fool
them, and do not need any explicit image manipulation or
hacking with an intention to fool such systems. Weather-
based changes in the environment fall into such a category,
which we focus on in this work. For example, as shown in
Figure 1, when fog is added to the scene, the steering angle
predicted by deep learning models deviates by a significant
amount from the original, making these models vulnerable
to such ‘weather-adversarial’ data.
In this work, we bring together two perspectives: the data
augmentation one and the adversarial one, to explicitly gen-
erate weather-adversarial images that can fool deep neural
networks for autonomous vehicles (steering angle predic-
tion, in particular). To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first effort in this direction. Such an effort is important
to provide essential data from different conditions that are
likely to affect (or attack) such models. Our work can be
utilized to test steering angle prediction models and their ro-
bustness against adverse weather conditions. (We focus on
fog in this work, due to the availability of relevant data, but
our framework is generalizable and can be easily extended
to other weather conditions.) Our work also demonstrates
that current steering angle models used in self-driving cars
are inadequate to handle weather variations in real-world
settings. The key contributions of this work are as follows:
• We bring together data augmentation and adversarial
perspectives to introduce a methodology that can gen-
erate foggy images that are intended to ‘fool’ models
for steering angle prediction in autonomous vehicles.
Our methodology integrates an adversarial loss term
in an unpaired image-to-image translation framework
[42][4] towards the aforementioned objective. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first such effort, in
particular, for autonomous navigation applications.
• Existing adversarial attack models are largely focused
on classification tasks; we provide an extension of such
attacks to regression tasks such as steering angle pre-
diction models.
• We validate the proposed methods using qualitative
and quantitative analysis on a well-known autonomous
navigation dataset to showcase its promise. We also
show that a model that is adversarially trained using
the images generated by our method provides signifi-
cant robustness to the model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we review previous related efforts in the areas
of autonomous navigation and adversarial attacks. We de-
scribe our methodology in Section 3, with a perspective of
how this provides a more general notion of natural adver-
saries. Our implementation details, experiments and results
are shown in Sections 4 and 5 respectively, followed by con-
clusions and future directions in Section 7.
2. Related Work
Considering the focus of this work, we present an
overview of related earlier efforts from perspectives of both
testing the robustness of vision models in autonomous nav-
igation, as well as adversarial attacks in general. In each of
these discussions, we present the limitations of the existing
efforts and the scope of improvement when the proposed
method is used.
2.1. Adversarial Attacks
The conventional notion of an adversarial attack is gen-
erally formalized as: given a classification model f , and
input image x, we define a perturbation δ as a quantity that
is added to x such that:
argmax f(x+ δ) 6= argmax f(x) and ||δ|| ≤  (1)
The δ defined above has usually been specific to the input
and found through methods like FGSM [15], JSMA [27],
and the more recent PGD [24]. The δ may also be common
to the entire dataset and may be found iteratively like in
the case of UAP [26] or may be generated by a GAN [28].
For the interested reader, a detailed survey of these meth-
ods is provided by Akhtar et al. in [2]. All these methods
attempt to add a perturbation to the image, which can fool
the trained model. Our proposed work is different in two
ways from these efforts: (i) we extend the concept of adver-
saries to go beyond additive perturbations to natural pertur-
bations such as induced by weather changes in disturbing
the model (similar to [18], can be considered implicitly ad-
versarial); (ii) most existing efforts focus on adversarial at-
tacks in classification settings, and there has not been much
effort to define an adversary in a regression-based setting.
We propose an adversarial loss for regression models (steer-
ing angle prediction, in particular) in this work.
Attacking Autonomous NavigationModels: There have
been a few explicit efforts in the recent past to develop
adversarial attacks for vision models in self-driving cars.
Works such as that of Eykholt et al. [13] utilize adversarial
patches [6] which are physically added to objects like traf-
fic lights to fool the model. Similarly, Zhang et al. [41] re-
sort to physically camouflaging cars to fool object detector
models used in autonomous navigation systems, to test the
robustness of the model. We observe that these efforts rely
on physical changes in the environment to attack the black
box models, for which human effort in case of large scale
testing may be prohibitive. On the other hand, it has been
shown that weather-induced environment changes naturally
result in implicit adversarial circumstances for the model
involved [29], and robustness to such weather-adversarial
samples is also critical for models in autonomous naviga-
tion. We hence focus on generating natural-looking images
of existing scenes affected by weather conditions (in partic-
ular, fog, in this work).
2.2. Testing Autonomous Navigation Models with
Weather Changes
Since the advent of Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs), there have been limited efforts that have explicitly
attempted to analyze the effect of different weather con-
ditions on steering angle prediction models in self-driving
cars. DeepTest [35] used synthetic images generated using
Photoshop to study the impact of rain and fog on the pre-
dicted steering angle. The manpower required for a large-
scale deployment is prohibitive for such an approach. Deep-
Road [40] tried to automate the same using generative mod-
els instead. DeepRoad learns the translation to different
weather conditions; however, the sole goal for this work
is to perform image-to-image translation with no explicit
goal to ‘fool’ the model or obtain any minimum deviation of
steering angle from the ground truth. In this work, we bring
together adversarial and unpaired image-image translation
perspectives to produce a minimum deviation in steering
angle prediction in the produced images. We also show in
Section 5 that our method to generate fog adversaries causes
an average perturbation of nearly 1 radian(∼ 60 degrees),
which can serve as a rigorous platform to test vision models
in autonomous navigation.
2.3. Fog Generation
Adverse weather conditions such as fog are common in
day-to-day life. There have been very few efforts based on
image processing and filters to generate fog in images. We
note that most related work in this direction based on im-
age processing focus on defogging [22, 39], whereas our
work is focused on the generation of fog. Li, et al [21]
and Sakaridis et al[32] attempt to generate fog using image
processing methods with a strong prior. A prior is usually
carefully constructed based on handcrafted features, such as
texture and brightness, from the image. Unfortunately, us-
ing such priors automatically restricts the approach to con-
straints on expected intensity, texture, and other features
present in the image. Besides, in settings of autonomous
navigation, handcrafted priors do not scale to the significant
variations in scenes and environments, as well as significant
variations in a single scene due to effects induced by factors
such as light-and-shadow and fast motion. In this work,
we attempt to provide an automated method to generate fog
images that are intended to distort steering angle prediction
models, to improve robustness of such models. We show
later in this paper that performing adversarial training using
the images generated by our method provides significant ro-
bustness to the model.
3. Methodology
When a carefully crafted perturbation is added to the im-
age such that it causes the network to misclassify, we call it
an adversarial perturbation (as in Sec 2.1). For a classifier
network f and an input image x; the perturbation, φ applied
on it may be defined as:
argmax f(φ(x)) 6= argmax f(x) (2)
To ensure visual similarity, the adversarial image should be
within  (very small) distance of the original input. This
constraint is generally include to the above problem as:
s.t ||φ(x)− x|| ≤  (3)
In the case of an additive perturbation, we define φ as:
φ(x) = x+ δ
We observe that this results in the same set of equations as
earlier in Eqn 1.
We now use this definition to extend the typical form
of adversarial perturbations, by allowing φ to be more than
simple additive perturbations. We can define φ as a mul-
tiplicative noise or a filter, or a neural network itself can
model it. We expect any transformation created by φ to be
valid in such a setting as long it guarantees task-perceptual
similarity, discussed below.
Task-Perceptual Similarity. In the case of images, the
adversarial attacks performed are such that both the adver-
sarial image φ(x) and original image x are perceived to be
similar. This usually includes visual similarity like in the
case of many popular attacks like FGSM [15] and JSMA
[27]. Recent works have shown that simple image transfor-
mations like rotation, scaling, and the translation are suf-
ficient to fool the network [12][3]. These efforts do not
emphasize complete visual similarity, yet we humans find
them to be perceptually similar, i.e., they are interpreted in
the same way by the human visual system. Following this,
we can extend the definition of adversaries beyond visual
similarity to something more intuitive: task-perceptual sim-
ilarity.
To ensure the same, in Eqn 2, we expect the transforma-
tions created by φ to be such that the result predicted by
humans for the given task is the same for both the origi-
nal input and the adversary. The transformation need not
necessarily guarantee visual similarity, but the task at hand
needs to be perceived in the same way by the human. Exam-
ples of such transformations for images include contrast and
brightness changes, blurring, rotation, scaling, sharpening,
whitening, the addition of noise, etc. In all of these cases
or a combination of these, humans are capable of perceiv-
ing the image similarly; this is, however, not the case with
neural network models. One should note that visual sim-
ilarity generally guarantees task-perceptual Similarity, but
the converse need not hold. In Eqn 2, in order to guarantee
visual similarity, one may simply add a constraint like that
of Eqn 3.
3.1. Adversarial Attack on Regression Models
From the previous definition of adversarial perturba-
tions, we may redefine it for a regression network, N as:
||N(φ(x))−N(x)|| ≥ θ (4)
This implies we want the perturbation applied to the image
x to cause a minimum deviation of θ. As stated earlier in
Section 2.1, φ can be purely additive or another function
captured by a neural network. We may add additional con-
straints on φ for visual similarity or sparsity. We can then
simplify Eqn 4 to:
||N(φ(x))−N(x)|| − θ ≥ 0
=⇒ θ − ||N(φ(x))−N(x)|| ≤ 0 (5)
Hence, we define regression loss, Lregress required for cre-
ating an adversarial sample for input x as:
min
φ
Lregress = min
φ
(θ − ||N(φ(x))−N(x)||) (6)
By minimizing Lregress, we can find the perturbation, φ
which ensures that a minimum deviation is caused for every
input sample, x.
3.2. Proposed Idea
Steering angle prediction models are fundamentally de-
signed to be regression models, and take the input scene
to predict the angle of the steering wheel in the range of
[−pi, pi]. We have previously seen in Fig 1 that adverse
weather conditions like fog affect the steering angle pre-
dicted by a model. Fog may be represented as a mixture
of blurring and whitening on an image. We also observe
that a foggy image is perceived in a similar manner as the
normal one by a human, especially when it comes to tasks
like steering angle prediction. To elaborate further, in Fig.1,
we as humans expect the same steering angle for both the
sets of images but the network does not. We leverage this
fact to design a testbed for steering angle models using ad-
verse weather conditions. Hence, combining the previous
two sections, we can utilize weather conditions like fog to
attack steering angle prediction models adversarially.
To achieve this goal, we define N as our steering angle
predictor in Eqn 6 and φ as our adversarial weather gener-
ator for a given sample x. We train a generator, φ to learn
the transformation (Sec 3.3) from normal weather to foggy.
The weights of φ will be obtained by minimizing Eqn 6.
We now have φ, a generator being modeled by a neural
network and a continuous-valued discriminatorN . The θ in
the equation naturally becomes the minimum steering angle
deviation we desire.
3.3. Loss Formulation
We train a CycleGAN [42] to learn the translation be-
tween the normal (sunny) weather (Domain A) and the ad-
verse weather condition images (Domain B). φAB is the
Generator responsible for the translation from Domain A
to B and φBA for the reverse. Similarly, DA is the Discrim-
inator responsible for Domain A and DB for Domain B.
CycleGAN utilizes adversarial losses across its generated
images. It also uses a cycle-consistency loss which ensures
that when an image x belonging to Domain A, is translated
from Domain A to B and back to Domain A, remains the
same. i.e.,
x ≈ φBA(φAB(x))
This also applies in a similar fashion for images from Do-
main B. Hence, CycleGAN loss in total consists of: 2
LCycleGAN = Lcycle(φAB , φBA)+
Ladversarial(φAB , φBA, DA, DB)
We augment the CycleGAN losses with the regression loss
(Eqn 6) and train this combined loss.
Hence the net loss that the CycleGAN is trained on:
Ltotal = (1− α)LCycleGAN + αLregress (7)
where, Lregress = θ − ||N(φAB(x))−N(x)|| (8)
In the above equation α is a multiplier lying between (0, 1).
We summarize the working of the network in Figure 2 and
also in Algorithm 1.
2For complete details of the CycleGAN loss, please refer Zhu et al[42].
Figure 2: Summary of the framework followed to train the CycleGAN network to fool the steering angle predictor N .
The image-to image translation part of the system learns the translation between Normal, Sunny weather(Domain A) and
Foggy weather(Domain B). The adversarial generator part helps φAB generate foggy images which can cause a minimum
deviation(θ) in the predictions of N .
One may note that we can use any other domain transla-
tion model instead of CycleGAN to achieve the same goal.
To demonstrate the efficiency of our concept, we run our
experiments on another recently popular model: Distance-
GAN [4]. This model utilizes CycleGAN losses along with
a distance loss to ensure that the distance between a pair of
samples is maintained across both the domains.
4. Implementation
Network Architecture: For the domain translation be-
tween normal to foggy weather, we use the CycleGAN
model. The generators in the model use the same architec-
ture involving Resnet-9 blocks as described in [42]. We also
utilize similar architecture for the DistanceGAN model[4].3
For the steering angle models, we use AutoPilot[8] which is
an improvement on NVIDIA PilotNet model[5]. The model
is adapted with an additional convolution layer for 128×128
images. We also perform similar experiments on the archi-
tecture developed by Comma AI [33].
Datasets used: There are many weather conditions which
are capable of causing a large deviation in steering angle
predictions. However, due to unavailability of datasets with
heavy snow or rainy weather conditions, we restrict our-
selves to foggy conditions [31]. We, however, note that our
framework is generic and can be extended to other weather
conditions.
We train the CycleGAN model[42] to learn the domain
translation from normal, sunny weather to foggy weather
conditions. The sunny weather condition images are ob-
tained from the widely used SullyChen’s dataset [8]. We
3Project Webpage: https://code-assasin.github.io/little fog/
Algorithm 1 CycleGAN training pseudo code
Input X ← Training samples from Domain A
Input Y ← Training samples from Domain B
Input N ← Steering Angle Model to be Fooled
Input T ← Number of epochs to train
Input θ ←Minimum deviation desired
Output {φAB , φBA, DA, DB}
1: procedure GENERATE()
2: for t in {1...T} do
3: Draw m training samples {x1, ..xm} from X
4: Draw m training samples {y1, ..ym} from Y
5: for i in {1, ...m} do
6: x← xi ; y ← yi
7: Compute: yˆ ← φAB(x) . Forward Cycle
8: Compute: xˆ← φBA(y) . Backward Cycle
9: Compute the losses:
10: Lregress(φAB , x) . Eq. 8
11: Lcycle(φAB , φBA, x, y, xˆ, yˆ)
12: Update Generators
13:
14: Compute Discriminator losses:
15: Ladversarial(φAB , φBA, DA, DB , x, y, xˆ, yˆ)
16: Update Discriminators
17: end for
18: end for
19: end procedure
chose this dataset over the Udacity dataset [36] due to its
better quality. The Udacity dataset has many images with
blank bright spots or hazy regions, making it difficult for
the Generator to learn the translation to its equivalent foggy
condition. Most other steering angle based datasets are ei-
ther virtual [11] or of poor quality with minimal variations
[33], and hence not suitable for this work.
Our foggy weather images (to train the CycleGAN) are
taken from the Foggy Zurich dataset [31], which consists
of 3.7k high-quality images collected during the occurrence
of fog in and around Zurich. The steering angle prediction
model is trained on the Sullychen dataset [8], and the MSE
is shown in Table 1.
Preprocessing: In order to train the CycleGAN, the nor-
mal weather images from Sully Chen’s dataset [8] are sam-
pled since many of the frames consist of similar scenes.
After sampling (Systematic sampling with an offset of 12
frames), we obtain nearly 3.7k images for training the Cy-
cleGAN. The foggy images from [31] consist of a wiper and
a dashboard in their scenes, something absent in the normal
images dataset. Hence we crop the bottom few pixels of the
foggy images to train the CycleGAN. Both the dataset im-
ages are resized to 128 × 128 pixels and then used to train
the CycleGAN. For the steering angle models, however, we
use the entire Sully Chen dataset [8], split into a train and
test set. The images are resized to 128×128 and normalized
between [−1,+1].
Training details: We train the CycleGAN model along
with the regression loss to learn the translation between nor-
mal and foggy weather conditions (Eqn 6). The parameters
used in case of the CycleGAN losses are mostly the same as
those mentioned in [42] except for the identity loss having
a multiplier (λidentity) of 3 . The model is then trained with
both losses. The value of α is chosen to be 0.2 and θ is 0.5
radians (∼ 30 degrees).
DistanceGAN model: We also train the DistanceGAN
[4] model with similar preprocessing, as mentioned above.
We used the hyperparameters as used in the code provided
by [4], with the exception of the identity loss. We choose
the value of α to be 0.07 and θ as 0.5 radians.
Model Train Error Test Error
AutoPilot[8] 0.0185 0.0448
Comma AI[33] 0.0198 0.0551
Table 1: Test + Train error for different steering angle mod-
els
5. Results
We showcase the results of our trained model in Fig.3
along with the steering angle, predicted for each image.
We observe that the second image has nearly a 180 degree
change in the predicted angle, indicating how dangerous
these adverse weather conditions can be, further encourag-
ing the need for testbeds provided by methods like ours.
5.1. Subjective Image Quality Assessment
We assess the realism of the foggy images generated by
the CycleGAN after being trained with the Regression Loss.
We asked 10 participants to assess the quality of the gener-
ated foggy images. These participants had never seen the
normal, sunny version of the image before and were asked
to judge the realism of the foggy image provided to them.
We use the foggy images from the Foggy Zurich dataset as
the control for these experiments. We ran this experiment
for different variations of the CycleGAN model used. We
observed that on an average (for both steering prediction
models), nearly 48% (44% for DistanceGAN) of the par-
ticipants found the fog generated by utilizing Regression
loss to be real enough compared to Foggy images from the
Zurich dataset [31]. Additionally, we asked participants to
choose the between the foggy images produced by Cycle-
GAN (or DistanceGAN) and those produced when regres-
sion loss was added. We asked them to compare theses im-
ages based on their quality. We found that nearly 43% (48%
for DistanceGAN model) of the people found that Cycle-
GAN with regression loss produces better images. Consid-
ering this is nearly half the participants, we find that our
method produces images of comparable quality as the orig-
inal foggy images.
5.2. Objective Image Quality Assessment
We use standard Image quality assessment metrics like
MSE, PSNR, SSIM[38] to compare the quality of the nor-
mal sunny image, w.r.t its foggy counterpart for different
flavors of the models used. We report the results for the
same in Table 3. In addition, we compare the image quality
of foggy images produced using produced by CycleGAN
alone and those produced when Regression loss was added
(see Table 4).
We see from Tables 3 and 4 that the regression loss in-
deed causes a visible change in the image. Visibly also the
quality of the images without regression loss seems to be
better than those produced with it. To study the efficacy of
regression loss, we compute the difference in steering an-
gle predicted for foggy images produced by the CycleGAN
model with and without regression loss, i.e., we compute:
||N(φfoggy(x))−N(φˆfoggy(x))||
φfoggy is the CycleGAN Generator responsible for the
translation from normal to foggy domain and φˆfoggy is the
same generator trained with the Regression Loss. From Ta-
ble 2, we can clearly see that the deviation produced with
and without our loss is clearly very significant for both the
CycleGAN and DistanceGAN model.
Figure 3: Fooling Models: Ground truth Steering Angle (in radians) for each of the original test samples. The angles right
below indicate the ordered pair of predicted steering angle by AutoPilot and Comma AI respectively. From the second row
onward, we indicate the image translation model used and respective steering model it was trained on. The angle below each
of those images indicates the prediction by the steering model for the generated foggy image.
Figure 4: Variation in image quality of CycleGAN for different α values
Method Deviation Caused
Cycle vs Cycle+Regress (AutoPilot) 1.09± 0.9
Cycle vs Cycle+Regress (Comma AI) 0.76± 0.7
Distance vs Distance+Regress(AutoPilot) 1.31± 0.5
Distance vs Distance+Regress(Comma AI) 0.58± 0.54
Table 2: Deviation caused with regress loss in comparison
to the original models (Calculated using Eq.8)
Method MSE PSNR SSIM
Cycle 3172± 1172.4 13.4± 1.8 0.51± 0.08
+Regress(AutoPilot) 3024± 1076 13.7± 1.9 0.52± 0.07
+Regress(Comma AI) 3111.2± 1086 13.5± 1.9 0.52± 0.08
Distance 2073.2± 663.4 15.18± 1.4 0.59± 0.05
+Regress(AutoPilot) 3292± 1085.8 13.2± 1.56 0.54± 0.07
+Regress(Comma AI) 2327± 811 14.7± 1.6 0.61± 0.058
Table 3: Objective IQA normal w.r.t respective foggy coun-
terpart using different methods
Method MSE PSNR SSIM
Cycle vs (AutoPilot) 802.9± 446.6 19.6± 2.04 0.64± 0.06
Cycle vs (Comma AI) 868.4± 491 19.3± 2.17 0.64± 0.07
Distance vs (AutoPilot) 2025.2± 1253 15.8± 2.56 0.52± 0.07
Distance vs (Comma AI) 1362.± 786 17.43± 2.36 0.57± 0.068
Table 4: Results using different I.Q.A methods. For each
row we compare, the model and its counterpart trained with
regression loss on the respective steering model.
6. Ablation Studies
We notice in Eq.8 that there is a subtle balance between
the CycleGAN and regression loss. While LCycleGAN is
responsible for the quality of the foggy images generated,
Lregress is responsible for causing the minimum deviation
in the steering angle model. We can see that either loss over-
powering the other is undesirable. Hence, a subtle balance
must be created between them to achieve the end goal. To
gain a deeper understanding of this, we explore variations
in the hyperparameters α and θ. For all of the experiments,
we use a CycleGAN[42] model along with the AutoPilot[8]
model as the steering angle predictor.
Variation in α. We vary the hyper-parameter α (defined
in Eq.8) to study its effect on the images generated by the
CycleGAN. We choose a constant value of θ = 0.5 radians
for these experiments.
• α = 0.2 : With a decent value of α, as seen in Section
5, it produces fairly good results. The image quality of
the CycleGAN remains pretty clear while causing the
minimum required deviation.
• α = 0.5 : With a moderate value of α, although we
expect to average results, the image quality of the Cy-
cleGAN is completely wrecked.
• α = 0.8 : With very high value of α, Lregress is given
more importance. This causes the output foggy images
to have lower-quality than those obtained in Section 5.
While for α = 0.2 it only takes 150 epochs to reach the
desired goal, for higher values of α it seems to take more
epochs to converge. For α = 0.5 it took nearly 200 addi-
tional epochs to settle while the losses kept oscillating for
0.8. We can also see the variation in their quality in Fig 4.
Variation in θ. We vary the minimum deviation θ in the
Eq. 8 to see its effect on the generated images. For all
experiments with changes in θ, we fix our α value to 0.2.
• θ = 0 radians : In this case, we would ideally expect
the Lregress to be dominated by LCycleGAN but we
observe that in a matter of few epochs the Lregress val-
ues start becoming highly negative hence the net loss
function start shifting its attention towards minimizing
the regression loss without paying heed to the Cycle-
GAN losses. This causes a lot of deterioration in the
image quality of the foggy images.
• θ = 0.5 radians : As seen in Section 5, this value of
θ relayed good results both in terms of image quality
and deviation produced.
• θ = 1 radians: With a higher value of θ the number of
epochs taken for convergence was much higher with
nearly similar quality as those obtained with θ = 0.5.
Hence, we prefer to reduce our costs by utilizing θ =
0.5. In addition, θ = 0.5 itself is causing an average
deviation of 1 radian (Table 2) hence reaping the ben-
efits without additional costs.
Similar trends, for θ and α, are seen using the Distance-
GAN [4] model.
Regression loss on Backward Generator φBA: From
Eq. 8 we can observe that the Regression loss is applied
only to the forward cycle of the CycleGAN. Our goal is
only to create adverse weather conditioned images and not
vice-versa. Hence the Regression loss is only applied on
φAB . To test if adding a regression loss on backward cycle
might help, we add the following term to Eq. 8:
LBregress = θ − ||N(φBA(y))−N(y)||
Where y belongs to Domain B(foggy weather). This loss
is then multiplied with α, same as in Eq. 8. We train the
CycleGAN model in conjunction with these losses. As seen
in Fig. 5, the results of this model seems to be distorted,
and of poor quality. We also observed that the loss seemed
to oscillate. We believe that this occurs because backward
regression loss forces the normal images generated to cause
distortion. There is a good chance (as in Sec 6) that the re-
gression loss dominates over the CycleGAN loss and hence,
might even generate blank images which are perfectly capa-
ble of causing the desired deviation in the steering angle. To
prevent this from happening, we ensure that the generated
image is perfectly capable of being returned to the original
(Eq. 3.3). We hence do not include the adversarial loss term
in φBA.
Figure 5: Original images (left) and foggy counterparts
(right) generated using regression loss in both directions
Defending against Fog: We train the AutoPilot and
Comma AI models with the foggy counterparts of the train-
ing dataset [8], generated using the proposed method. We
then test the model on the foggy counterpart of the test set.
From Table 5, there is a clear improvement in the devia-
tion caused once the model is adversarially trained using
the foggy images generated by our method.
Method Trained on Deviation Caused
AutoPilot Normal 1.81± 1.03
AutoPilot Foggy 0.17± 0.4
Comma AI Normal 1.88± 0.84
Comma AI Foggy 0.2± 0.7
Table 5: Deviation caused with regress loss in comparison
to the original models
7. Conclusions
As part of our work, we introduced a more generic def-
inition of adversarial perturbations. Our definition makes
use of the more understandable Perceptual Similarity rather
than Visual Similarity. We have also introduced a man-
ner in which adversarial perturbations may be used to fool
regression-based networks such that they cause a minimum
deviation. We then showed how this could be applied to
steering angle models to generate sufficient Fog to produce
a minimum deviation in the scene. In the future, with the
help of better datasets, we would like to construct more
stringent testbeds to evaluate the credibility of autonomous
navigation.
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